With hundreds of French
troops in Mali, and hundreds more headed that way, the U.S. among other
countries, has also pledged some limited support: intelligence, communication, logistics,
unarmed drones. But Washington obviously would like to keep a low profile. Washington,
in fact, had been militating against just such a move, fearing that another
Western intervention in an Arab land would provide another ideal recruiting
target for erstwhile jihadis across the Muslim world, not to mention to
provoking a spate of terrorist attacks in Europe.
In fact, though, it turns
out that the U.S. has already played a major role in the crisis. It’s a
devastating lesson of plans gone awry, another dreary footnote to the law of unintended
consequences.
According to an
excellent New
York Times account, for the past several years, the United States has
spent more than half a billion dollars in West Africa to counter the threat of
radical Islam, America’s “most ambitious counterterrorism program ever across these vast,
turbulent stretches of the Sahara.”
The aim of the program was that, rather than
rely on the U.S. and its allies to combat Islamic terrorism in the region, the
United States would train African troops to deal with the threat themselves.
To that end, for five years U.S. Special
Forces trained Malian troops in a host of vital combat and counterterrorism
skills. The outcome was considered by the Pentagon to be exemplary
But all that collapsed as the result of another
unintended consequence-- of the French-led intervention in Libya. After the
fall of Khadhaffi, droves of battle-hardened, well-armed Islamic fighters and
Tuareg tribesmen, who had been fighting in Libya, swarmed into Northern Mali.
Joined by other more radical Islamist forces,
some linked to Al Qaeda, they had no trouble defeating the Malian army.
Why? Because of the defection to the rebels of
several key Malian officers, who had been trained by the Americans. Turns out that those officers, who were
supposed to battle the rebels, were ethnic Tuaregs, the same nomads who were part
of the rebellion.
According to the Times, The Tuareg commanders
of three of the four Malian units in the north, at the height of the battle, decided
to join the insurrection, taking weapons, valuable equipment and their American
training with them. They were followed by about 1600 additional army defectors,
demolishing the government’s hope of resisting the rebel attack.
In other words, it’s very
likely that the French and their allies-to-come in Mali will be battling rebel troops
trained by the U.S. Special Forces.
Caught totally by surprise by the whole ghastly mess, the American
officials involved with the training program were reportedly flabbergasted.
There are obvious questions:
How was it possible for the Special Forces and their Pentagon bosses and the
CIA to have had such a total lack of understanding of the Malian officers they’d
trained and the country they’d been operating in for over five years?
But you
could ask that same question about U.S. military actions in any number of
countries over the past few decades, from Lebanon to Iraq to Afghanistan, where
the most apt comparison might be
to releasing elephants into a porcelain shop.
Which leads to a more
fundamental question: how is the U.S. to avoid similar catastrophic mistakes down
the road? The Pentagon has recently announced that some 3,000 troops, no longer
needed in Afghanistan, have been reassigned to work with the local military in 35
countries across Africa--to deal with the threat of Al Qaeda-linked terrorism.
Sounds just like what was
going on in Mali.
But does anyone really think
the U.S. and its military will have a better understanding of the myriad
forces, tribes, religions, governments, legal and illicit financial interests
struggling for power and influence in those countries than it did in Mali?
Or in Iraq, Or Afghanistan
or Iran or Somalia or Lebanon, or Vietnam or Cambodia.
And has France now embarked
down the same tragic path?